I. Endogenous Growth Models with Optimizing Households
I begin with endogenous growth models that build on constant returns to a broad concept of capital. The representative, infinite-lived household in a closed economy seeks to maximize overall utility, as given by U= {u(c)ePtdt, 
where a > 0, so that marginal utility has the constant elasticity -(. Each household-producer has access to the production function y = f(k),
where y is output per worker and k is capital per worker. Each person works a given amount of time; that is, there is no labor-leisure choice. As is well known, the maximization of the representative household's GOVERNMENT SPENDING S 105 overall utility in equation (1) implies that the growth rate of consumption at each point in time is given by c Or (( P),
where f' is the marginal product of capital. Instead of assuming diminishing returns (f" < 0), I follow Rebelo (1991) by assuming constant returns to a broad concept of capital; that is, y = Ak,
where A > 0 is the constant net marginal product of capital.' The assumption of constant returns becomes more plausible when capital is viewed broadly to encompass human and nonhuman capital. Human investments include education and training, as well as expenses for having and raising children (Becker and Barro 1988) . Of course, human and nonhuman capital need not be perfect substitutes in production. Therefore, production may show roughly constant returns to scale in the two types of capital taken together but diminishing returns in either input separately. The Ak production function shown in equation (5) can be modified to distinguish between two types of capital, and the model can be extended, along the lines of Lucas (1988) , Rebelo (1991) , and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (this issue), to allow for sectors that produce physical and human capital, respectively. In comparison with the Ak model, the main additional results involve transitional dynamics whereby an economy moves from an arbitrary starting ratio of physical to human capital to a steady-state ratio. For studying steady-state growth, however, the important element is constant returns to scale in the factors that can be accumulated-that is, the two types of capital taken together-and not the distinction between the factors. Substitutingf' = A into equation (4) yields w = 6 = 1 * (A -p),
C OU where the symbol y denotes a per capita growth rate. I assume that the technology is sufficiently productive to ensure positive steadystate growth, but not so productive as to yield unbounded utility. The corresponding inequality conditions are ' This formulation effectively reverses Solow's (1956) extension of the Harrod (1 948)- Domar (1947) model to return to a setting with a fixed capital/output ratio. The formulation differs, however, from the Harrod-Domar model in that saving choices are privately optimal (as in the analyses of Ramsey [1928] , Cass [1965] , and Koopmans [1965] ).
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A > p > A(1 -or).
(7)
The first part implies y > 0 in equation (6). The second part, which is satisfied automatically if A > 0, p > 0, and a -1, guarantees that the attainable utility is bounded.
In this model the economy is always at a position of steady-state growth in which all variables-c, k, and y-grow at the rate y shown in equation (6). Given an initial capital stock, k(O), the levels of all variables are also determined.2 In particular, since net investment equals yk, the initial level of consumption is c(0) = k(0) (A -y).
I now modify the analysis to incorporate a public sector. Let g be the quantity of public services provided to each household-producer. I assume that these services are provided without user charges and are not subject to congestion effects (which might arise for highways or some other public services). That is, the model abstracts from externalities associated with the use of public services.
I consider initially the role of public services as an input to private production. It is this productive role that creates a potentially positive linkage between government and growth. Production now exhibits constant returns to scale in k and g together but diminishing returns in k separately. That is, even with a broad concept of private capital, production involves decreasing returns to private inputs if the (complementary) government inputs do not expand in a parallel manner. In a recent empirical study, Aschauer (1988) argues that the services from government infrastructure are particularly important in this context.
Given constant returns to scale, the production function can be written as
where q) satisfies the usual conditions for positive and diminishing marginal products, so that +' > 0 and +" < 0.3 The variable k is the 2 With a perfect capital market (and given constant returns to scale and no adjustment costs for investment), the scale of a competitive firm would be indeterminate in this model. However, the aggregates of capital stock and investment would be determined. 3 Arrow and Kurz (1970, chap. 4) assume that public capital, rather than the flow of public services, enters into the production function. Because output can be used for consumption or to augment private or public capital and because the two capital stocks are transferable across the sectors, this difference in specification is not substantive. They assume also that the flow of services from public capital enters into the utility function, a possibility that I analyze later on. Their analysis differs from mine in assuming diminishing returns to scale in private and public capital, given an exogenous GOVERNMENT SPENDING S 107 representative producer's quantity of capital, which would correspond to the per capita amount of aggregate capital. I assume that g can be measured correspondingly by the per capita quantity of government purchases of goods and services. In some of the subsequent analysis, I assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, so that k +k) (k) 0 where 0 < a < 1. A number of questions arise concerning the specification of public services as an input to production. First, the flow of services need not correspond to government purchases, especially when the government owns capital and the national accounts omit an imputed rental income on public capital in the measure of current purchases. This issue is important for empirical implementation of the model. But conceptually, it is satisfactory to think of the government as doing no production and owning no capital. Then the government just buys a flow of output (including services of highways, sewers, battleships, etc.) from the private sector. These purchased services, which the government makes available to households, correspond to the input that matters for private production in equation (9). As long as the government and the private sector have the same production functions, the results would be the same if the government buys private inputs and does its own production, instead of purchasing only final output from the private sector, as I assume.
A second issue arises if public services are nonrival for the users (as is true, e.g., for the space program). Then it is the total of government purchases, rather than the amount per capita, that matters for each individual. As is well known at least since Samuelson (1954) , this element is important for determining the desirable scale of governmental activity. My view is that few actual government services (including, as Thompson [1974] argues, national defense) are nonrival. But the present analysis can be modified to include this aspect of publicness without changing the general nature of the results.
The general idea of including g as a separate argument of the production function is that private inputs, represented by k, are not a close substitute for public inputs. Private activity would not readily replace public activity if user charges were difficult to implement, as in the case of such nonexcludable services as national defense and the amount of labor services (which corresponds to population). Therefore, the per capita growth rate in their model depends in the long run entirely on the exogenous rate of technological progress. 
where -is the elasticity of y with respect to g (for a given value of k), so that 0 < -q < 1. Note that the marginal product, aylak, is calculated by varying k in equation ( Roughly speaking, to maximize the growth rate, the government sets its share of gross national product, gly, to equal the share it would get if public services were a competitively supplied input of production. The solid curve in figure 1 shows the relation between the growth rate, -y, and the tax and expenditure rate, 7 = gly, for the CobbDouglas case. (The graph assumes specific numerical values for the parameters at, A, p, and a, solely for illustrative purposes.) The growth rate is positive over some range if the economy is sufficiently productive relative to the rate of time preference. The condition for a range with positive growth (which generalizes the condition A > p from the Ak model) is A'/(' -) * (1 -ct)2 * ot/( > p. Also, as before, I assume that the economy is not so productive that it allows the attained utility to become unbounded; the condition here is p > Al/(''t) * (1 -r)(1 -ct)2 * ot0/('-'), which must hold if A > 0, p > 0, and :-1.
If the production function is not Cobb-Douglas, the dependence of ,q on gik in equation (13) The condition that utility be bounded, mentioned before, ensures that p > y(l -a).
Equations (13) and (14) 
II. A Planning Problem for the Government
The results on the size of government in the previous section are solutions to second-best policy problems. Because of familiar externalities implied by public expenditures and taxation, the decentralized choices of saving turn out to generate outcomes that are not Pareto optimal. In fact, the departures from Pareto optimality are analogous to those in the Arrow (1962)-Romer (1986) learning-bydoing models, which relied on the public-goods nature of privately created knowledge.
The easiest way to assess the external effects is to compare the decentralized outcomes with those from an unrealistic planning problem. Suppose that the government chooses a constant expenditure ratio, gly, and can then dictate each household's choices for consumption over time. (It is straightforward to show that a constant gly is optimal in this planning problem.) Given a value of g/y-which, for the moment, I treat as arbitrary-the government picks the consumption path to maximize the representative household's attained utility, where the expression for utility is again given in equations (1) The term inside the brackets and to the left of the minus sign is the social marginal return on capital, given that the expenditure ratio, gly, is constant. Note that, to maintain gly, an increase in y by one unit requires an increase in g by gly units. Since the increase in g comes out of the current output stream, the term 4(glk), which is the effect of k on y, is adjusted by the factor 1 -(gly) to calculate the social return on capital.
The condition gik = (gly) *(g/k) implies that the derivative of yyp from equation (20) An individual producer computes the marginal product, dy/dk, while holding constant the quantity of public services, g, that he receives from the government. This assumption is appropriate for some types of public services, and I maintain this assumption for now. But if the government sets a given expenditure ratio gly, an increase in national product by one unit induces the government to raise the aggregate of its public services by gly units. Thus when an individual producer decides to raise his individual k and y, he is indirectly causing the government to increase its aggregate spending. The effect on that individual's public services, which entered into his production function, would be negligible (under my assumption about how public services are provided) and can therefore be ignored. But it is nevertheless true, with gly fixed, that an individual's decision that 4 This result under lump-sum taxation implies that the solution T = gly = at is time consistent under income taxation and a Cobb-Douglas technology. Suppose that future governments will set the income tax rate, T(t) = at, for all t > 0. Then, for given k(O), the current income tax rate, r(O), is effectively a lump-sum tax. In particular, the current choice affects neither past investments (which cannot be undone) nor expected future tax rates (which matter for current and future investment). If the government could run budget surpluses and thereby accumulate assets, it would be attractive to choose a very high value of T(0) and use the proceeds to finance future spending (which otherwise would require distorting income taxation). However, the balanced-budget constraint in eq. (11) rules out this possibility. Therefore, the government selects the current tax and expenditure ratio, T 
(O) = g(O)/y(O), as it would under lump-sum taxation. But the solution to this problem is r(O) = g(O)/y(O) = at.
In the absence of the balanced-budget constraint, the government would have the usual incentive to effect capital levies, so that T(t) = at would no longer be time consistent. (Private investors would also anticipate these levies and act accordingly.) The result (t) = at would then hinge on the government's ability (starting from time t = -oo) to commit itself to a constant tax rate. Figures 1 and 2 also allow a comparison between lump-sum taxes (which could be consumption taxes in this model) and income taxes. At the point gly = a (in the Cobb-Douglas case), the lump-sum tax generates the command optimum and is therefore superior to the income tax. For gly < a, the lump-sum tax comes closer than the income tax to the command optimum; therefore, the lump-sum tax would also be preferred here. However, for gly > (x, the comparison becomes ambiguous because the lump-sum tax choices, YL and SL, are too large, while the income tax choices, y and s, are too small. For very large governments (i.e., gly well above a), the outcome under income taxes can be superior to that under lump-sum taxes. The reason is that the income tax is an imperfect way to get individual producers to internalize the distortion described above. With gly > a, people have too great an incentive to expand output by an additional unit because the government is thereby induced to increase its expenditures by gly units. If government spending were worthless, the way to internalize this distortion would be to tax the individual's income at the rate X = gly. As gly gets well above its ideal value, ax, the return from more government spending, 4)', diminishes; that is, it becomes more nearly accurate that government spending is worthless at the margin. Therefore, the income tax becomes more nearly the right way to offset the negative externality, and the value y in figure 1 gets steadily closer to the value yp. Similarly, in figure 2, s and sp converge as gly approaches one.
III. Tax Systems and Property Rights
Within the framework of an income tax, the (average) marginal tax rate, T, can vary for a given expenditure ratio, gly. For example, differences in the degree of graduation or in enforcement policies Si 16 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY could generate these variations in T. If T decreases, for a given gly, the response is a movement in the direction from the solid to the dashed curve (i.e., from y to YL) in figures 1 and 2. Hence, for given gly, the rates of growth and saving increase.
From the standpoint of investors, enhanced property rights look like reductions in marginal tax rates. Therefore, an improvement in property rights also generates a shift in the direction from the solid to the dashed curve in figures 1 and 2. Hence, the rates of growth and saving again increase.
Many functions of government, such as maintenance of law and order and national security, help to sustain property rights. (Others, including some regulatory and legislative activities, have opposing effects.) An increase in spending, g, in areas that enhance property rights causes a reduction in the effective value of T rather than a direct effect on the production function. However, the effects on growth and saving are similar to those for the productive government expenditures considered before. In particular, the relation of growth and saving rates to the amount of government expenditure devoted to the enforcement of property rights would resemble the solid curves shown in figures 1 and 2.
IV. An Alternative Specification for Public Services
Thus far, each individual held fixed his quantity of public services, g, when considering a change in his quantity of capital, k, and output, y. This setting is appropriate for some public services but not for others. For example, for police and fire protection, and perhaps for national defense, the amount of public services that an individual receives is roughly proportional to the amount of property that the person has to protect. (Thompson [1974] argues that an increase in an individual's appropriable property makes the home country more attractive to foreign aggressors and thereby increases the home country's overall burden for providing national security.) These cases can be approximated by assuming that each individual holds constant his ratio of public services to output, gly, rather than his level of public services. With a flat-rate income tax at rate 7, the individual's optimization problem now coincides with the planner's problem considered before. Hence (for the case in which public services appear directly in the production function), the decentralized choices lead to the growth rate yp shown in figure 1 
where Tg = gly is the government's expenditure ratio for productive services, and Th = hly is the ratio for consumption services. Households' decentralized choices for consumption and saving (with g and h taken as given) now lead to the growth rate Figure 4 shows the corresponding saving rates, Sh and s. For a given Th and a Cobb-Douglas production function, it is easy to show that the value of Tg = gly that maximizes Yh in equation (25) is ( -TO-). In other words, the growth-maximizing share of productive government spending is smaller if the government is also using the income tax to finance other types of spending. However, this choice turns out not to maximize the utility attained by the representative household.
Suppose that each household's utility function is given by equation (23) and that Tg = gly and Th = h/y are set to maximize the overall With these results, it is feasible to relate the attained utility, U, to the expenditure ratios Tg = gly and Th = hly. There are then two first-order conditions corresponding to the maximization of U. Combining these conditions for the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function leads to the familiar result: Tg = gly = ot. That is, as long as Th = hly is also chosen optimally, the optimal ratio for productive government expenditures is the same as before. Namely, the criterion is still productive efficiency, so that 4' = 1 and gly = ot.
VI. Self-interested Government
Thus far, I assumed that the government was benevolent and therefore sought to maximize the utility attained by the representative household. I now consider the alternative that the government is run by an agent who has no electoral constraints and seeks to maximize his own utility. where the expenditure ratio gly can differ from the income tax rate T. The government agent uses his net revenue to purchase the quantity of consumer goods, cg. The agent receives utility from consumption in the same manner as any household; that is, the flow of utils is u(cg) from equation (2), and the overall attained utility, U, is given by the integral in equation (1). In addition, the government agent has the same discount rate, p, as each household.
With constant values for T and gly, the privately determined growth rate is still the value y from equation ( The optimal expenditure rate gly equals a, as in previous models; that is, the productive-efficiency condition, 4' = 1, still holds. Since the choice of gly is mainly one of efficient production, the self-interested government chooses the same value as the benevolent government. Basically, the government agent sets gly = a to maximize the tax base that he has to work with. Then he is also in the position to set T > gly to secure the net flow of revenue, cg.
The results in this section parallel those in the preceding one. In effect, the government agent's consumption, cg, plays the same role that the government's consumption services, h, played in the previous model. In both cases the presence of these consumption flows does not upset the conditions for productive efficiency, which imply (for Cobb-Douglas technology) that the government's productive expenditures are the fraction a of total output. However, the ratio of government revenues to output exceeds a in both situations: in one case to provide consumption to the government agent and in the other to provide government consumption services to each household.
VII. Some Empirical Implications
The theory has implications for relations between the size of government and the rates of growth and saving. Because the analysis applies to steady-state growth paths, the natural empirical application would be to differences in average performance across countries over long periods of time.
As is usual in empirical investigations, the hypothesized effects of government policy are easier to assess if the government's actions can be treated as exogenous. That is, the results are simple if governments randomize their actions and thereby generate useful experimental data. In this case, variations in the share of productive government expenditures in GDP, gly, affect the growth and saving rates, Yh and Sh, as shown by the dashed curves in figures 3 and 4, respectively. (The precise curves apply with a proportional income tax and CobbDouglas production function and in settings in which individuals treat their own allocations of public services, g and h, as given.) As suggested before, productive government spending would include the resources devoted to property rights enforcement, as well as activities that enter directly into production functions. Countries could be arrayed along the horizontal axes by the size of gly, and the responses of y and s would be nonmonotonic, as shown in the figures.
An increase in the share of nonproductive government expenditures, say hly in the model of Section V, leads to the types of shifts shown by the movements from the solid to the dashed curves in figures 3 and 4. For a given value of gly, an increase in hly lowers the GOVERNMENT SPENDING S121 growth and saving rates. These effects arise because a higher hly has no direct effect on private-sector productivity, but does lead to a higher income tax rate. Since individuals retain a smaller fraction of their returns from investment, they have less incentive to invest, and the economy tends to grow at a lower rate.
The predictions are similar for any other differences across countries that imply that private investors get to retain a smaller fraction of their returns from investment. For example, if gly is held fixed, an increase in the average marginal tax rate or an exogenous worsening of property rights would tend to lower the growth and saving rates.
Aside from problems of measuring public services and the rates of growth and saving, the empirical implementation of the model is complicated by the endogeneity of the government. Within the theoretical model (and with a Cobb-Douglas production function), the government sets the share of productive expenditures, gly, to ensure productive efficiency (4' = 1). Therefore, instead of being arrayed along the horizontal axes in figures 3 and 4, each government would operate at the same point, gly = a. Within this framework of optimizing governments, cross-sectional variations in gly arise only if a differs from country to country.
The parameter a, which measures the productivity of public services relative to private services, could vary across countries for a number of reasons. These include geography, the share of agricultural production, urban density, and so on. For present purposes it is unnecessary to predict how any specific element would affect a, and therefore gly, for an optimizing government. As long as the variations in a are independent of the overall level of productivity,5 the model predicts how the induced variations in gly will correlate with those in y The result is that a rise in a, and hence in gly, will reduce Y.6 The intuition is that an increase in ao means a shift in relative productivity toward the factor g that has to be financed by a distorting tax. It is for this reason that a higher a correlates negatively with y The more general conclusion is that gly and y would show little correlation across countries because each government goes to the point at which the marginal effect of gly on y is close to zero.
For government expenditures that provide only consumption services, the implications are more straightforward. Variations in the expenditure share for government consumption, h/y-viewed as generated from differences in preferences for public versus private ser- 
VIII. Empirical Results on Government and Growth
The literature includes a number of empirical studies on the relationship between government and economic growth. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) studied 47 countries in the post-World War II period, using data on total government "consumption" expenditures and other variables from International Financial Statistics. This measure of government spending excludes public investment and transfers but includes most expenditures on defense and education. Although the category is called consumption, it does not necessarily followespecially for defense and education-that these public services enter mainly into utility functions rather than into production functions or as influences on property rights. Using data for each country averaged over roughly 20-year periods, Kormendi and Meguire found no significant relation between average growth rates of real GDP and average growth rates or levels of the share of government consumption spending in GDP (p. 147). Grier and Tullock (1987) extended the Kormendi-Meguire form of analysis to 115 countries, using data on government consumption and other variables from Summers and Heston (1984) . The concept of government spending is the same as that employed by Kormendi and Meguire. The Grier-Tullock study was a pooled cross-section, timeseries analysis, using data averaged over 5-year intervals. They found a significantly negative relation between the growth of real GDP and the growth of the government share of GDP, although most of the relation derived from the 24 OECD countries (their tables 1 and 2).
Landau (1983) studied 104 countries on a cross-sectional basis, using an earlier form of the Summers-Heston data. He found significantly negative relations between the growth rate of real GDP per capita and the level of government consumption expenditures as a ratio to GDP (table 1). His definition of government consumption is again the same as those used above. However, his regressions held constant a measure of investment in education, which would be one component of an economy's broadly defined investment. Since one channel for a negative effect of more government on growth involves a reduction in investment, the interpretation is different if a component of investment is held constant.
Barth and Bradley (1987, table 1) found a negative relation between the growth rate of real GDP and the share of government consumption spending for 16 OECD countries in the period 1971-
